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Recent work on efficiency wage models has produced an internally consistent  macro-theory of
involuntary unemployment (underemployment)' whose basic assumptions and implications have
largely been corroborated by empirical micro-studies. 2 Although the microeconometric work was
motivated by macroeconomic theory, it has never been fully integrated into a macroeconomic
framework. 3 In this paper we offer one version of such an integrated approach.  More precisely, we
first develop an efficiency wage model with labor turnover (Phelps 1968, Stiglitz 1974, Salop 1979,
Hoon and Phelps 1992) and show that the worker's  decision problem  gives rise to a quit-rate
function. We then use microeconomic data to  estimate this  quit-rate function and to  test the
specification suggested by economic theory. Finally, microeconomic evidence and macroeconomic
model are combined to evaluate the quantitative effects of changes in economic policy and other
macroeconomic shocks on the wage rate, the turnover rate, and employment in the long-run (steady
state analysis).
The efficiency wage model with labor turnover we employ is in principle applicable to any
type of movement of labor across sectors in any country (Bulow and Summers 1986). However, the
original  literature  on  this  type  of  efficiency  wage  model  has  mainly  focused  attention  on
unemployment in developed countries (Phelps 1968, Salop 1979, Phelps and Hoon 1992). We, on
the other hand,  test and calibrate our model using panel data on the movement of Mexican workers
between the formal salaried and the informal self-employed sector. Our choice of the data set was
motivated by the following two considerations.
'See Katz (1986)  and Woodford  (1994) for surveys.
2See  Katz (1986)  and Layard, Nickell, and Jackman  (1991)  for surveys.
3The quantitative papers by Danthine  and Donaldson  (1990,1995)  and Kimball (1994)  on
efficiency  wage models  with shirking  (Shapiro  and Stiglitz  1984)  consider  microeconomic  evidence
when calibrating  the macroeconomic  model,  but do not incorporate  a microeconomic  estimation  equation
into the macroeconomic  model as we do. In this sense, we feel that we have come closer  to a full
integration  of the two fields of labor economics  and macroeconomics.  See also Blanchard  and Katz
(1997) for a statement  in favor of such an integrated  approach.First, the efficiency wage model with labor tumover captures well a number of features of
LDC labor markets, and in particular the Mexican case we consider. The literature suggests that the
self-employed informal sector comprises both workers rationed out of formal salaried jobs as well
as a relatively prosperous "upper tier" that may prefer self-employment. 4 In other words,  the
literature is consistent with  one of the central ideas of  the efficiency wage model with labor
turnover, namely that at each point in time workers are voluntarily leaving their formal-sector job
for self-employment and simultaneously self-employed workers are unsuccessfully trying to reenter
the formal sector. Moreover, neither minimum wages nor unions are credible explanations for the
observed segmentation. 5 Finally, Constitutional proscriptions against firing suggest quittiing  as the
dominant mode ofjob  separation.
Second, our data set has an important time dimension which allows us to estimate the
quitting response of individual workers to changes in macroeconomic conditions.  Given our final
goal of quantitative macroeconomic analysis, this feature ofthe data set seems essential. In addition,
the data on self-employed workers offer a measure of the benefits (payoffs) to not being employed
in the  formal  sector that  displays  substantial variations  over  time.  These variations  in  self-
employment benefits are important since they provide us with an additional test of the "quitting
theory" which predicts that labor turnover is positively correlated with expected benefits to self-
employment and that the quit-rate function is symmetric: the benefits-elasticity of quitting,  is equal
to the negative ofthe wage-elasticity of quitting. Moreover, if the symmetry property ofthe quit-rate
function is supported by the data on self-employed workers, we may use it as a working hypothesis
(until refuting evidence is forthcoming) and apply it to unemployment.  This opens the door for an
assessment of the quantitative macroeconomic  effects of changes  in unemployment benefits without
4 Harris and Todaro  (1970)  offer the canonical  statement  of the dualistic  (rationing)  viewv  and
Fields (1990) discusses  the "two-tier"  view of the informal  sector.
5Bell(1996)  finds no evidence  that minimum  wages are binding. Maloney  and Ribeiro  (1998)
find evidence  of union influence  on employment,  but none on wage setting.
2directly  estimating  the elasticity  of quitting with respect to unemployment  benefits,  usually an
impossible  task given  the lack of temporal  variations  in these  benefits.
Our empirical  estimates  of the determinants  of labor flows from the salaried  to the self-
employed  sector  strongly  support  the specification  suggested  by the quitting  theory:  the individual
probability  ofjob separation  is decreasing  in  the formal-sector  wage  (the  expected  payoffto staying)
and  increasing  in benefits  to self-employment  and  the  probability  of finding  a formal-sectorjob  (the
expected  payoff to leaving). Moreover,  the above mentioned  symmetry  property  of the quit-rate
function cannot be rejected.  When the microeconomic  estimates are  used to calibrate the
macroeconomic  model, we find the long-run  effects of macroeconomic  shocks  on wages, labor
turnover,  and  (formal-sector)  employment  to be substantial.  The  strong  employment  response  found
here stands in stark contrast to the disappointingly  small unemployment  effects  reported by
Danthine  and  Donaldson  (1990,1995)  and Kimball  (1994)  who  calibrate  an efficiency  wage  model
with shirking  (Shapiro  and Stiglitz 1984) to US unemployment  data. 6
This paper  can be interpreted as providing  a two-stage  "test"  of the real  world relevance  of
efficiency wage  models  with labor turnover. In the first stage, microeconomic  data are used to
estimate  and test what we believe  to lie at the heart of this type of efficiency  wage  model,  namely
the quit-rate  function. If the coefficients  are found to be significant  and of the correct sign, in a
second  stage  the estimated  quit-rate  function  is incorporated  into  the macroeconomic  model  and  the
calibrated  model  economy  is used to assess  the quantitative  importance  of efficiency  wages. This
second-stage  check is important  since  there seems  to be little value in having  a macroeconomic
theory  of unemployment  (underemployment)  which  is supported  by microeconomic  data  but  implies
an almost constant unemployment  (underemployment)  rate.  In this paper we present one fully
worked out example  of  this two-stage  procedure  in the hope that it will spur interest in further
6Danthine  and  Donaldson  (1990,  1995)  explicitly  consider  aggregate  uncertainty  by solving  a
stochastic  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model.  Kimball  (1994)  studies  the dynamic  and  steady  state
effects  of macroeconomic  shocks  in a deterministic  model,  but  his quantitative  result  on  employment
variations  is obtained  by  comparing  steady  state  equilibria.
3applications  to different  countries  and different  sectors.  Such work is likely to add an important
dimension  to the existing  empirical  literature  which  has  either  completely  focused  on  the micro-level
or solely  relied on cross-country  regressions.!
The paper  is organized  as follows. Section  2 develops  the model. Almost  all derivations,
and in particular  the discussion  of the worker's decision  problem, is relegated to the Appendix.
Section  3 presents  the empirical  analysis  of the panel data  on Mexican  workers  and some  additional
information  on the Mexican  labor  market. The specification  for the estimated  quit-rate  function  is
dictated  by the theory  developed  in Section  2. In Section  4 the macroeconomic  model  is calibrated
and the simulation  results are presented. Section  5 concludes.
2. The Model
The model  is a discrete-time,  neoclassical  growth  model  with a labor market  characterized  by labor
turnover,  employment-adjustment  costs (hiring  and  training  costs),  and wage-setting  by firms. The
analysis  will be confined  to equilibria  in which a number  of economic  variables  grow  at a constant
rate equal to the exogenous  rate of technological  progress  (balanced  growth  path).
a) Workers
There is a large number  of ex-ante identical,  infinitely-lived  workers. Workers' preferences  over
random  consumption  sequences  allow for a time-additive  expected  utility  representation.  Workers
do not participate  in financial  markets  and therefore  do not save or dissave. Hence,  each worker's
7See,  for example,  Phelps  (1994),  Nickell  (1997),  and  Phelps  and  Zoega  (1998)  for empirical
work  using  cross-country  regressions.  Blanchard  and  Jimeno  (1995)  conduct  an interesting  case  study
comparing  two  countries,  Spain  and  Portugal.  The  method  outlined  in this  paper  provides  a fonnal
procedure  for quantifying  the importance  of efficiency  wages  in explaining  the different  macroeconomic
experiences  of two  countries.
4consumption level is equal to his current disposable income. 8
In each period a worker devotes a fixed amount oftime to one of the following two activities:
working in the formal sector or working in the informal sector of the economy. Our informal-sector
data in the empirical section are taken from the self employed and we will therefore call a person
working in the informal sector a self-employed worker. In each period, a worker, regardless of his
current employment status,  receives an idiosyncratic shock determining the relative attractiveness
of  employment  versus  self-employment  ("taste-shock",  change  in  expected  payoff  to  self-
employment).  After observing the shock realization, an employed worker makes a  quit/stay
decision and a self-employed worker makes a search/no-search decision.  Whereas an employed
worker automatically becomes self-employed when deciding to quit a job, a self-employed  worker
who decides to search for formal-sector employment receives ajob offer only with probability less
than one.
The Appendix Al  discusses the Bellman equation associated with the worker's decision
problem and analyzes the resulting optimal decision rule. The optimal decision rule gives rise to a
quit-ratefunction, q.  = q(w,,w,p;T,b),where  q, standsforthequitrateexperiencedbyfirm  i,  w 1
for the (growth-adjusted) wage paid by finn  i,  w the average (growth-adjusted) wage, p for the
probability of finding (formal sector) employment when not employed, X for the tax rate on formal-
sector  labor  income,  and  b  for  the  average  (growth-adjusted)  pecuniary  benefits  from  self
employment.
Let q(w,p;t,b)  i  q(w,w,p  ; T,b)  _be  the economy-wide quit-rate fimction  when all
8ln a sense,  this assumption  renders  the model  classical  rather  than neoclassical. It is mainly
made for tractability  reasons  since  it trivially  deterrnines  the wealth  distribution  of workers  (no wealth).
Without  this assumption the wealth distribution  is in general  non-trivial  and has to be computed  as part
of the equilibrium,  except  when there is complete  consumption  insurance. The assumption  of restricted
capital  market participation  is also made in Danthine  and Donaldson  (1990,1995)  for the same  tractability
reason. Kimball  (1994)  does not treat capital  accumulation  and therefore  does not deal with wealth
effects. Phelps (1994)  emphasizes  wealth  effects,  but nowhere  develops  a complete  general equilibrium
model with endogenize  wealth  distribution. We hope  to dispense  with this assumption  in future  work.
5firms pay the same wage.  Clearly, this function is identical to the quit-rate function in an economy
with only one representative firm. The function  4(.),  however, is the function entering into the
profit maximization problem of an individual firm (see Appendix A2) in a many-firm economy. In
Appendix Al we show that  the individual quit-rate function, q (.),  satisfies
aq  O;  a  ,  ,  as4  aq,O  aq  ;(l
-<  0.  qeq>  0 a  .0;  1
aw,.  a  w  ap  ab  al
and that the economy-wide quit-rate function, q(.),  satisfies
.aq  <O  ,  aq >,o
aw  ap
(2)
aq  - laq  l aq>  o
ar  bab  -wew
The empirical analysis conducted in Section 3 tests the sign and symmetry restrictions (2) and finds
strong evidence in favor of them. Our panel data on worker transition provide no information about
the quit-rate function of an individual firm in a many-firm economy,  q(.).  Appendix Al, however,
shows that the two marginal quit-rate functions (approximately) satisfy
a q  (w  'Wwp;,rB)  Iw  =W  - (w,p;,r,B)  aq  (w,p;,r,B)  3
1 - 3bw(l  -q(w,p;'r,b))  (1 -p)
=(,  b  - 1 - 3 (1 -q(wp,;T,b))
where  1w is the discount factor of  workers.  Expression  (3) enables us to  make quantitative
predictions about the impact of economic  policy knowing only the economy-wide quit-rate :function
q(.).  The parameter  pt  measures the difference between the reduction in the quit-rate when an
individual firm raises its own wage and the reduction in the quit-rate when all firms raise their wages
simultaneously.
6b) Capitalists (Firms)
There are i = 1, ... ,N  infinitely-lived capitalist with identical preferences  who each own one firm
with identical production technology.  There is one good which can be used for consumption and
investment purposes.  Firm i combines capital and labor to produce output.  Adjusting the amount
of labor employed is costly since there are hiring and training costs.  We assume that adjustment
costs are fully paid by firms.'
Taking the economy-wide wage as given, each firm i chooses a sequence of  consumption
(of owner i ), capital, investment, employment, hiring, and own-wage which maximize the capitalist'
life-time utility subject to the relevant constraints. The decision problem faced by firm (capitalist) i
is fully spelled out in Appendix A2. The resulting Euler equations for the growth-adjusted variables
are
131gP  x  ai(  F  -+-(k 11 1 1,1+ t  =c  (,t+l  ak(  1'' °(1  +,  d  1
:..  PiC(l+g)-  [i,t+l(  +i,t+,  (WfX  +i,t+lt  al  It,t+l  li,+1  -i  T(i,t+d)  (4)
X.,  = c t p  ;Yi  =XT(h.)  ;  Yit  =  (  aW(iP)
where PC  and p are the capitalist' discount factor and coefficient of relative risk aversion, c.t her
growth-adjusted consumption level,  kit the capital stock per efficiency unit of labor, hit the hiring
rate,  li, the fraction of the labor force employed in the formal sector, and  X,  y,,  Lagrange
multipliers associated with physical, respectively human, capital accumulation constraints.  The
91n  our model with credit rationed  workers  owning  no wealth, only the firm can afford  to pay
these  costs. Even if workers  are not credit rationed  but human  capital created  by training is firm specific,
the firm is likely  to bear  the full cost of training (Salop 1979,  Hoon  and Phelps 1992,  Phelps 1994).  Of
course,  we do not consider  indirect  means  by which workers  can be made to bear some of the adjustment
costs. Wages  rising with tenure is one example.
7multiplier yt is the (utility) value of a trained employee  to the firm (the analog to Tobin's q).
Further, Sis the depreciation  rate of physical capital, F(.)  a standard neoclassical  production
function,  and T(.) the adjustment  cost function.
c) The Government
The government  collects  taxes  and spends  the tax receipts  on consumption  goods. We assume  that
tax receipts are equal to outlays in each period and that therefore the fiscal budget is always
balanced. For simplicity,  we assume  that informal-sector  workers  and capitalists  are not taxed so
that the tax revenue,  which is equal to fiscal spending,  is (Twl)N.
d) Steady  State Equilibrium
We are interested  in symmetric  steady state (balanced  growth) equilibria. Such an equilibrium  is
defined  as a list of (growth-adjusted,  per-capitalist)  values for output,  y *, capital k *, capitalists'
consumption c*,  (fornal-sector) employment  ,  1*, real wage, w  *, and hiring (quitting)  rate,
h '  = q *, such  that:
i)Given  the  quit-rate function, q(.),  and  expected labor market  conditions, (w  ,p*),
y *  , k * , I *, h *,  c *, w * are the solution to the capitalists' (firms') optimization  problem if the
initial capital  stock  and stock of trained employees  is (k *  *  ).
ii)The  quit-rate function, q(.),  is  the  solution to  the  worker's optimization problem.
iii)Expectations  are fulfilled,  that is, expected  values are equal to actual  values.
Because  of the assumption  of constant  returns  to scale,  the marginal  products  only depend
onthecapitaltolaborratio:  (k,l)  =  f'(E)  and  -(k  1) =  f(E)  -f'(k)k  with a  k  a  I
k = k/ I and f(k)  = F(k, 1). Using  the definition  of a steady state  equilibrium  and  Equation  (4),
we immediately  derive  the following  characterization  of a steady state equilibrium. The growth-
adjusted  capital  stock  per employed  worker is
8For given k,  the equilibrium  wage  rate, w  and the equilibrium  probability  of finding  aj ob, p *,
are the solution  to
f~(k )-f(k*)k*  -w  - T(Q(w ,p  ))  [ic(1  +g)yP  jT(q(w*,p  ))  =  0
(6)
T'(q(w*p*))p  +  1  0=  O  ( aq
Finally,  the equilibrium  values  of the remaining  variables  are determined  by
h=  q  = q(w*,p*)  ;  1*  =  (I  +  h-  -1  k*  =P*
p*v(l-q*)  (7
c*= F(k*,l*)  - Sk*  - w*l*  - T(h*)l*
where v  (1 - q *) is the fraction  of self-employed  workers searching  for a formal-sector  job.  The
parameter  v is a constant  which is discussed  in more detail  in Appendix  Al.
Evidently, the two equations (6) determining  the equilibrium  values w* and p*  are
equivalent  to
Z  - w-  T(q(w*,p*))  - rT(q(w*,p*))  =  0
(8)
T(q(w',p)  +  =0
R  (w *sp *)  '(  p*)
'0The consumption  of a worker  if employed  is w * (1  -T)  and if self-employed  is b. The
government  consumes (Tw  *l *)N.
9where Z  = f(k*)  +f  (k*)k*  is the marginal (revenue) product of labor and r  = 1 - C  (1 +g) P
the real interest rate.
It is often useful to depict the solution to (8) as the intersection of a downward-sloping "labor
demand curve" and an upward-sloping efficiency (incentive) wage curve. To the extend  that the
first equation in (8) expresses the optimal employment choice by firmns  and the second equation
represents the optimal wage setting by firms, this terminology seems justified.  The first equation
in (6) implicitly defines a function w  = w d(p)  with
dwd  (T'  +rT")  q
dp  1 + (T'  +  r T"))  (9)
6w
Since  aq < 0,  aq > 0,  T'  > 0,and  T"  2  0,thecurve  wd(.)  isdownwardslopingifandonly
aw  a
if  I aq  I  (T'  + rT")  <  1.  For  small  rT"  this  condition  is  always  satisfied  since
6w
q I T'=  <  1 (this follows fromthe second equationin(8)).  Note also thatifthereal  interest
rate is non-negative,  1. >  1 is a necessary (and if r T"  0  O a sufficient) condition for the w d_
schedule to be downward sloping.  Thus, in order to have a labor demand function with a negative
slope, the reduction in the quit-rate due to the increase of the individual firm's  wage must be larger
than the reduction in the quit-rate when all firms simultaneously increase their wage, wvhich  is
generally true in the model considered here.
The second equation in (8) implicitly defines a function with
T  - (  1 aq  -2  a2_  ag aq
dw_  alp  k ajwJ  8p6  aw  ap aw  1
dp  T"  Iaq_  ( ±  2§  a2q +6  q  (0  )
a3W  VA  aw)  aw2  aw  aw
10There is no straightforward way of signing the expression (9).)  Our empirical results suggest that
the quadratic and cross-derivative terms are zero. If in addition T"  =  0, we have
dp  p  8w
which turns out to be positive for the range of parameter values considered in this paper. Hence, the
efficiency wage curve is upward-sloping.
e) An Extension: Vacancies and Matching
The efficiency wage model developed so far shares one important feature with traditional search
models," 2 namely an endogenously determined labor turnover rate.  However, it also differs from
those models in important ways. First, in the efficiency wage model firms set wages in contrast to
the Nash bargaining solution usually deployed by the search literature.  In a sense, the efficiency
wage model is the limit case of the bargaining model in which firms have all the bargaining power
and are therefore in a position to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to workers.  Second, the search
literature deploys a matching (hiring) function relating the number of hires, hl, to the number of
vacancies, v, and the number of unemployed I - 1. This matching function describes the efficiency
of the job reallocation process. In this section, we briefly discuss the possibility of incorporating a
matching function into the efficiency wage model developed here.
For the sake of concreteness, consider the case in which the matching function is of the
Cobb-Douglas type, h I  = va (1 - 1)1 -a  where we assumed for simplicity that all unemployed (self-
employed) workers are searching for a formal-sectorjob.'3 Suppose further that the only adjustment
cost is the cost of posting a vacancy and that the unit cost of a vacancy is a constant, c. Hence, the
total cost of changing the employment level is T = c v.  Eliminating the number of vacancies, v,
yields a total adjustment cost  T = c (hl)l1a  ( 1 - 1)(1  -1/a)  and a cost of adjustment per employee of
"The sufficiency  conditions  for the firm's optimization  problems  do not guarantee  an upward-
sloping  curve.
1 2See Blanchard  and Katz (1997)  and Rogerson  (1997) for recent surveys.
" 3Recall  that in our notation  h is the hiring rate and hI is total hires of one firm. For simplicity,
we have set the number  of firms to one:  N  = 1.
11T = c hi/a ( 1/i)  Thus, we have an adjustment cost function which is convex in the hiring
rate, h, but also depends on the employment level, 1.  This dependence of the "training and hiring
costs" on the employment level is the only difference to the previous model formulation.  It is,
however, straightforward  to incorporate the more general adjustment cost function into the efficiency
wage model resulting into three steady state equations in the three unknowns w *  ,p *  ,  *. We plan
to  conduct quantitative policy analysis for such an  extended model with  a  general matching
technology in the future. The efficiency wage model developed in the last sections can be thought
of as the special case in which a = 1 since then we have T = c h, that is, an adjustment cost function
which only depends on the hiring rate. Incidentally, this function is linear, a property we assume in
the quantitative section 4.
3. Microeconomic Data Analysis
This section uses micro-economic data from Mexico to estimate the quit-rate function and to test the
model's predictions about the determinants of quitting behavior.  The quit-rate function estimated
here is used in Section 4 for macroeconomic policy analysis.
a) Data Description
The National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) conducts extensive quarterly household interviews
in the 16 major metropolitan areas and is available from 1987 to 1993. The sample is selected to be
geographically and socio-economically representative. The statistical agency (INEGI) expanded it
significantly over the period by adding municipalities, however,  we include only those present in
every year of the survey to prevent changes in  composition. The questionnaire is extensive in its
coverage of participation in the labor market, wages, hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found
in such employment surveys. INEGI's treatment of sample design, collection, and data cleaning is
careful. Surveys and documentation of methodology are available on request.
The ENEU is structured so as to track a fifth of each sample across a five quarter period. To
construct the panels, workers were matched by  position  in an  identified household,  level  of
education, age and  sex  to ensure against generating spurious transitions.  Using just  the first
12variables to concatenate and following changes in sex across the panel led to mismatching (or
misreporting) of under  .5 percent.  Taken together, we have 24 complete panels of 5 periods
spanning a total of  28 quarters where transitions could occur across a seven year period which
includes a time of recession (1987-88), recovery (1989-91), and then stagnation (1992-1993).
Though the model deals with decisions to be self-employed generally, we further narrow the
population by only considering self-employed workers in the "informal" sector. We use the term
'informal' here to refer to those unprotected by labor law, more specifically, owners of firms under
16 employees who do not have social security or medical benefits. In fact, under 1% of these firm
have more than 5 employees so the definition corresponds closely to that commonly used in the
development literature.  Formal salaried workers are defined as those in firms of over 16 workers
who enjoy labor protections. To eliminate the "self-employed" in consulting firms or other high end
activities, we analyze male workers with a high school education or less between the ages of 16-65.
The dependent variable is a 0, 1  index that captures whether the worker moved during a
particular quarter.  If he should move back to salaried employment and then move again to self-
employment, this is counted as a second quit.  The macro wage and benefit variables employed in
the regression analysis,  logw 1 and logb,,  are the median  for the entire sample (spanning five
panels) for each quarter. The probability of being hired, p,,is  the number ofthe self-employed who
transition to the salaried sector, as a fraction of those looking for a salaried job.  Vhile we know the
total number of self-employed, we do not observe the share searching in each period which theory
predicts should vary with macro-shocks. We assume that this fraction is proportional to, or at least
highly correlated with, the standard measure of search, the unemployment rate. The probability p,
is therefore proxied by Pt, the number of the self-employed moving into salaried work divided by
the number of unemployed.  Even though we thereby avoid the need for time series data on the
search intensity, we still require information about the sample average of this variable in order to
rescale the estimated coefficient appropriately when conducting the macroeconomic simulations in
Section 4.  To this end, we use the survey response from the National Micro-Enterprise Survey
(ENAMIN) which in  1992 re-interviewed  roughly  11,000 of those in the 1991:4 ENEU who
13declared themselves self-employed. In particular, it asks the motivation for opening the business and
offers eight non-exclusive responses. 13.5 percent  responded that they could not find work as a
salaried worker and another 3.2 percent responded they were laid off at their previous job.  We use
the rounded up number of 20% in our baseline model as an estimate for the average fraction of self-
employed workers searching for a formal-sector job (see Section 4).
The last two columns of table 1 present the summary statistics for the variables used in the
regression analysis.  On average  2.5% of salaried workers transit into self-employment in one
quarter. The standard deviations also suggest substantial variation in the macro variables across the
period.
b) Econometric Specification and Results
We are interested in implementing an empirical procedure allowing us to estimate the quit-rate
function q  =  q (w,p,  b).  In the Appendix we show that if workers' utility is logarithmic and if the
optimal decision rule is approximtated  by a first-order Taylor expansion, then we can write
q  =  (D(a%  +  a-  logw + a  P + a,  logb  + oC)  j_1)
where PD(.) is the distribution function of an unobserved, worker-specific shock variable '9'. The
random variables  { C0',  are identically distributed and capture all differences in taste and ability
across workers influencing their quitting decision. The relevant derivatives ofthe quit-rate functions
are then given by  I  aq =  0,  b ab  =  a, (p(x),  and  aq  =  a p(x),  where  p(x)is  the
b  ab  ~~ap  P
probability density evaluated at x = ao + a W + a  D + a. b.  Hence, the inequalities (2) expressing
the implications of the theory now read  a  < 0,  a  > 0, and ab>  Oand the symmetry relation says
14aw = -a,.  fThere  are two difficulties with implementing (11) econometrically.1 4
First, the discussion in the Appendix only deals with the case of deterministic changes in the
macroeconomic variables w , b , and p  whereas the data are better described by a stochastic process
{(w,,pt,bt)}7 0. If, however, the process of macro variables,{(w,,p,,b,)}0,  is Markovian, a
straightforward extension of the analysis shows that the optimal decision rule of workers still gives
rise to a quit-rate function
qt  = (DaO  + al loew± + a  p  + a,  logb, +).  (12)
since the current macro state (w,,pt,  b,) is a sufficient statistic for the future evolution ofthe relevant
macro variables (we again assumed a first-order Taylor approximation). With some weak additional
assumptions, it can also be shown that the restriction imposed upon the signs of the coefficients
a,  a  " al, still hold.  From a quantitative point of view, the quit-rate function derived in the
Appendix corresponds to the quit-rate function when macroeconomic variables follow a random
walk (highly persistent macroeconomic shocks).  Given our short sample period (28 observations
over seven years), we do not attempt to test the random walk assumption.
Second, if we only use the macro variables  w  ,pt, b, as right-hand-side  variables, we
certainly loose a large amount of information about economic variables influencing the decision of
an individual worker since any observed difference in behavior is automatically attributed to the
unobserved idiosyncratic shock, 0'.  On the other hand, if we use the observed wage of individual
workers on the right-hand-side (plus additional human capital variables), as is done by  previous
14 There is an extensive literature  on structural  estimation  of Markov  decision  processes  (See
Eckstein and Wolpin(1989)  for a review  and Daula  and Moffitt  (1995)  in the labor  literature).  In contrast
to most of this literature,  we do not recover  the structural  (preference)  parameters  from the estimated
coefficients  aqlax  since  our macroeconomic  policy experiments  can be conducted  without  it.
Estimates  of preference  parameters,  however,  would  be essential  for a quantitative  welfare  analysis.
15cross-sectional studies estimating quitting  equations," 5 we mix together (transitory) micro- and
(permanent) macro-shocks since both types of shocks cause the individual wage to change..  In this
paper, however, we are mainly interested in the quitting response of individual workers to permanent
macro shocks.  These difficulties with using the currently observed individual wage are also the
reason  why  we  do  not  attempt  to  estimate  the  quit-rate  function  of  an  individual  firm,
q, = q(wi ,w ,p, b).  Our approach to this problem is to add to the right-hand-side of (12) additional
individual-specific human capital variables:' 6
q= = DaO +aogw+a  +  a  loab,  +  Y>a.H{i  +(13)
The particular specification (13) with 0t  satisfying standard error-term assumptions could,
for example, arise as the linearized solution of the worker's dynamic programming problem under
the following conditions.  Suppose we decompose the individual wage and the individual self-
employment benefits as follows
logwi  =  logw,  + logij-
(14)
logb/  =  logb,  + logn,,
where the macroeconomic variables, logw1, log b,, follow a Markov process, or more specifically
a  random walk.  Moreover,  assume that  the evolution of the idiosyncratic  wage and  benefit
component is given by
logrl'>  =  YS H  + 8w
(15)
log ,bt =  Ek  Ybkkt  +  (1bt)
5See, for example,  Pencavel  (1972),  Krueger  and Summers  (1988),  and Campbell  (1993).
" 6Though  in the empirical  analysis  we do not growth  adjust either w or b, in the log-formulation
such an adjustment  would be entirely  captured  in the intercept  term,  a0.
16wherethe ,,*  are  cons,nthes  humancapitalvariables  Hk, followamovprocess,  foreach  t = 0,1,...
the random  variables { e',4  and {  erbt  }j.,  are identically  and independently  distributed,  and for
each j c J  the processes { e,4.  and  { elb  }  are serially uncorrelated.  In principle, these
assumptions are not too restrictive as long as the observed variables, HkJ exhaust the list of relevant
idiosyncratic variables. In practice, however, there are always unobserved variables relevant for the
worker's  quitting decision whose existence causes a violation of our error-term assumption.  We
employ a random effects probit routine with estimates of Huber-While robust standard errors (see
below) to ameliorate this problem.
The technology  for estimating  mover-stayer  models in a rotating panel context is not
presently developed." 7 As Maddala(1987) notes,  simply pooling the data and then using standard
probit techniques would yield consistent but inefficient estimates because the correlation across
observations is not being exploited. As an internediate approach, we maintain the integrity of each
of the 24 panels,  but "pool" them to form one large four-period panel  (the first quarter is used to
establish the worker in the formal sector) of 100,978 observations.  Each observation includes the
human capital variables and move-stay index particular to the individual, as well as the two macro-
earnings variables and the proxy for the probability of finding a job corresponding to the potential
move's location in the span of 28 periods. We then estimate the transition equation using STATA's
panel probit routine. 18 This permits estimating Huber-While robust standard errors as a measure to
ameliorate violations of the assumptions on  a'  and  made above.
The results presented in the first two columns of table 2 strongly support the specification
1 7A substantial  literature  exists on limited  dependent  models  in a panel context (see Maddala
1983  and Baltagi 1996  for overviews)  and continuous  dependent  variables  in an incomplete  or rotating
panel context  (see Nijman,  Verbeek  and van Soest 1991  for a recent overview),  but there is no literature
analyzing  limited  dependent  variables in a rotating panel context.
18  As Maddala(1987)  notes, random  effects  probit estimators  are consistent  while the fixed effect
estimators  are not, in additional  to being  computationally  difficult.  We find it unlikely  that there is any
correlation  between  the random  individual  effects  and the macro  explanatory  variables  that would require
use of a fixed effects estimator.
17suggested  by our theory. The two earnings  elasticities  enter  of predicted  sign and significantly  at
the .1% level. A rise in self-employed  earnings  relative  to formal-sector  earnings  leads to more
workers  frying  their hand at self-employment.  Our  proxy,fl5,  for the probability  of finding  a formal
sector  job also enters as expected  and very significantly  offering  direct support to the efficiency
wage dynamic  postulated  here. The higher the probability  of finding another  job in the formal
sector, the more likely  a worker  will risk starting  his own business. A more complete  model  with
squares  and cross  terms  of the macro  variables  was also estimated  but none of these  additions  were
significant  and the results are not reported. Also consistent  with the model,  a x 2test cannot  reject
the symmetry  of the two income  related  elasticities  at the 5% level.  The next two columns  present
the results  when this constraint  is imposed. As expected,  they  are very similar  and are used  in the
simulations.
The human  capital variables  enter significantly  in both regressions. Since in the present
specification  they explain  the idiosyncratic  component  of the wage-benefit differential,  the signs
of the combined  effects  (evaluated  at the mean) are plausible. Increased  schooling  may plausibly
lead  to a larger  differential,  and hence  a lower  propensity  to move, because  of a greater  demand  for
skills in the formal salaried  sector. Conditioning  on schooling,  more experience  may raise the
probability of success in the self-employed  sector, lower the differential  and hence raise the
probability  of moving.
The regressions were also run with  an alternative dependent variable that dropped
observations  after the first quit and yielded similar  results.  We also compared  the results to the
theoretically  consistent standard probit techniques  on the pooled sample and found them very
similar  (available  on request).
Our estimation  results confirm the most basic implications  of the "quitting  theory". Even
though this is not the place for a detailed analysis of the full range of alternative  views of job-
separation,  we point  out  that the estimation  results  are inconsistent  with the simplest  "firing  theory",
18that is, the theory that termination  of existing  worker-firm  matches  is mainly  a decision  made by
firms. To see this,  suppose  that the quit-rate  is a constant  independent  of any economic  factors.
Suppose  further  that the firm's decision  problem  is identical  to the one discussed  in our efficiency
wage  model  with the only exception  that  the wage  is determined  in a competitive  labor  market,  the
labor supply  function  being derived  from a standard  labor/leisure  choice  of workers.  Consider  now
the response  of the economy,  which  is initially  in steady state,  to a negative  productivity  (demand)
shock. The dynamic  response  is likely  to be an increase  in firing  and a reduction  in hiring  by firms
since the new optimal employment  level is lower. In addition,  reduced  demand for labor can be
expected  to decrease  the wage. Hence,  firing (the left-hand-side  variable)  is negatively  correlated
with  the wage  and the probability  of finding  a job (hiring)  and  this  theory  therefore  predicts a  < O
and a  < 0. If formal-sector  and informal-sector  productivity  shocks  are uncorrelated  or positively
p
correlated,  which  is a reasonable  assumption,  we have in addition  the prediction  ab,  0. Thus, two
of the three inequalities  are rejected  by the data. We should  also mention  that if  we consider  an
exogenous  change in the wage (change in minimum  wage) for constant productivity, similar
reasoning yields a  > 0  . a  < 0  . al  = 0, which is even more strongly rejected by the data.
4. Macroeconomic Policy Analysis
Section 2 developed a macroeconomic model with labor turnover. The previous section estimated
an aggregate quit-rate function q (w,p;,r, b) using microeconomic data. In this section, we combine
the theoretical analysis with the empirical estimates in order to assess the quantitative effects of
different macroeconomic shocks on the wage rate, the turnover rate, and formal-sector employment.
This  is  done by  implicitly differentiating Equation  (8) with respect  to  the parameters under
consideration and thereby calculating the effect on the wage rate and the probability of finding ajob.
The effect on the labor turnover rate and formal-sector employment is then calculated using
dh  = dq  = -dw  +  q dp  + aq d
aw  ap  a'r
(16)
dl  =  1 +  h  I  h  d  - d
v(l-q*)  p  p*v(1-q*  P
19for the case of a tax reduction programn. Analogous expressions are used for changes in other
parameters.
a) Calibration
In order to make quantitative statements, we have to assign values to several parameters. We first
discuss a baseline version of the model and then proceed to explore the sensitivity of our results to
variations in the parameter values.  To be consistent with the empirical work, we assume that the
entire labor force consists of formal-sector workers and self-employed individuals.
An essential part of the model is the adjustment cost function T(.).  The comparative statics
result depend on T' and T".  The value of T'  is determined by theory through the second equation
in (10). Since we have no data allowing us to estimate T",  we assume  T"  = O,  that is, we assume
that convexities in adjustmnent  costs are weak (Section 2e  provides one scenario in which this is the
case). This assumption has the further advantage that the initial level of the equilibrium real interest
rate is irrelevant for the quantitative impact of macroeconomic shocks.
Another building block of the model is the economy-wide quit-rate function q(.)whose
properties determine the (local) effectiveness of economic policy. We take as values for the first-
order derivatives  the point estimates of Section 3 and assume, in accordance with the empirical
results, that all second-order derivatives are zero.9
The function p  (.)entering the second equation of (8) is calculated using the expression (3)
withtevalues,h  =  = 0.0 2 448,p*  = 0.2148,andW  =  O.9.ThequarterlyseparationrateofO.02448
is directly taken from the data and is the averaged, quarterly fraction of formal-sector employees
19Instead  of rewriting equation  (8) in terms  of log-wages,  we simply  normalize  the equilibrium
wage before  the policy change  to one. Thus,  we have  aqlaw  =  -aqlaT.  The estimates  of aqlax  are
constructed  by multiplying  the estimated  coefficients  an  by p (x).  In the case of aq/ap,  the estimate
of aq/apf is further  multiplied  by .2148/6.313 yielding  an estimate  for aqlap.
20leaving for self-employment. The probability of finding ajob, p x =  0.2148, is calculated using the
formula  p*  =  h  *  with a hiring (quitting) rate h*  = q  = 0.02448,  a formal-sector
employment level  I * = 0.637, and  a fraction of  self-employed workers  searching for a formal-
sector  job,v (1 - q *), taken to be 0.2 (see the discussion in Section 3 for the value 0.2). The implied
value of v is 0.21. Assigning a value to 13  is complicated by the assumption that workers do not
participate in capital markets, which implies that we cannot simply follow the real business cycle
literature and infer the discount factor from the long-run real interest rate (rate of return to capital).
Of course, if workers' discount factor were equal to the discount factor of capitalists, then this
procedure would still be valid.  But one reason why workers have only a small amount of wealth
might  be exactly their impatience relative to  capitalists.  We decide  to use a discount factor
13  =  0.9 for the baseline model, which is considerably lower than the 0.96 used in the real business
cycle literature. 20 Table 2 summarizes the choice of parameter values for the baseline model.
b) Simulation
Consider first a tax reduction program which lowers the tax on formal-sector labor income,  r, by
1% but leaves the (after-tax) earnings of self-employed workers, b, unchanged. For simplicity, we
also  assume  that  any  change in  government  revenues  is  met  by  a corresponding  change in
government spending so that the fiscal budget is balanced before and after the tax reform. As shown
in table 4, the quantitative effects of such a tax reform on all three variables of main interest is
substantial: the before-tax wage increases by 0.68%, the labor-turnover rate decreases by 2.63% (of
its initial value of .02448), and the formal-sector employment level rises by  0.91% (of its original
level of  0.637).
Figure  1 shows the effect of the tax reduction program as shifts in the labor demand and
efficiency wage curve.  The labor demand curve shifts to the right:  for given before-tax wage, w,
200f course,  the value of 0.96 is derived  by considering  US data.
21a tax reduction increases the after-tax wage reducing quitting which in turn increases  the demand for
labor and therefore p.  The efficiency  wage curve shifts to the left. Taken together, we conclude that
the wage unambiguously rises, but the effect onp is ambiguous. The decrease in p shows that the
change in the efficiency wage curve dominates. Even thoughp decreases, formal-sector  employment
increases because of the pronounced reduction in equilibrium hiring.
We can also evaluate the welfare consequences of the tax reform.  Clearly, workers gain in
the ex-ante and in the ex-post sense since the labor income (and therefore consumption) of iormal-
sector workers increases and  the earnings  of informal-sector workers has  not changed.  The
consumption of capitalists might increase or decrease depending on the shape of the production and
training  cost function as can be inferred from the expression  for equilibrium consumption of
capitalists (7).  Finally, the effect on government revenue, (twl)N,  is in general ambiguous since
there is a direct effect (the decrease in x) which tends to reduce revenues but two indirect effects
which tend to increase revenues (the increase in w and 1). For the Mexican case considered here the
average tax rate is a very small 8% which implies that the direct effect dominates and the tax
revenues are reduced.  As mentioned above, in our simulation we  assumed that this downfall in
receipts is matched by an equal reduction in outlays. Finally, it is worth mentioning that output of
the formal-sector economy is always increased simply because more workers are employed in the
formal sector.  If the productivity of the formal sector is higher than the productivity of self-
employed workers, then the reallocation of workers across sectors unambiguously raises total output.
Hence, in principle both workers and capitalists can always be made better off  if  the government
redistributes (in a non-distortionary  fashion) some of the gains of formal-sector employees to
capitalists.
Consider now a decrease in the earnings of self-employed workers, b, by 1% of its original
value. 2"  One possible reason for such a decrease in b is improved tax collection in the informal
21For simplicity  and for lack of precise data, we assume  that initially  w = b  = 1 .
22sector. Alternatively, one can think a drop in the demand for goods produced in the informal-sector
(non-tradable goods).  Clearly, if  .a! =  -!  (recall b = 1), a hypothesis suggested by theory and atr  ab
supported by our empirical evidence, then a 1% decrease in b is equivalent to a 1% increase in  r
except that in the former case the after-tax income of formal-sector employees increases by 1.68%
and in the latter case by 0.68%.  Notice, however, that the ratio w(l -')/b,  which measures the
pecuniary reward of formal-sector work relative to informal-sector work (earnings gap),  rises in
both cases by the same amount, namely 1.68%.
Let us now turn to the discussion of events shifting the labor demand curve only.  First,
suppose that the growth-adjusted marginal (revenue) product of formal-sector work, Z, increases by
1  %.22  Such an increase in Z could arise, for example, if along the development path the ratio of
formal-sector productivity to informal-sector productivity increases because secular technological
progress disproportionally favors the formal sector. As a second example, one can think of product
and/or labor market deregulation as well as a reduction in labor taxes paid by firms.  It also follows
from equation (8) that a reduction in the average training cost (for constant T' and  T" ) is equivalent
to an increase in Z by the same amount. 23 The qualitative impact of any of these events is illustrated
in Figure 2. For given wage w, a higher marginal product of labor increases the demand for labor
which in turn increases hiring and therefore the probability of finding ajob -- the labor demand curve
shifts to the right.  Since the efficiency wage curve is unchanged but downward sloping, the wage
rises but the probability of finding a job decreases in the new equilibrium.
The second line in table 4 summarizes the quantitative effects of a 1% increase in Z which
are very similar to the previous case: the before-tax wage increases by 1.56%, the turnover rate
22For  simplicity,  we set Z  = w  = 1, that is, we assume  that training  cost are "small"  compared  to
wage cost.
23Observe,  however,  that an increase  in Z by 1% of its initial  value is very different  from a
decrease  in training cost by 1% of total training cost as long as T(average  training cost) is considerably
smaller  than Z
23declines  by 2.19%,  and the employment  level rises by 0.93%.
Finally,  we turn  to changes  in the real  interest  rate,  r. It follows  immediately  from  Eq.  (8)  that
a  1% (100 basis points) drop  in  r  is  equivalent to  an increase in  Z  by  T'%.  Since
T'  = (p k -y =  10.53 in the baseline  model,  the impact  on all endogenous  variables  is very large.
The linear approximation  used here, however,  is certainly  not appropriate  for changes  of such a
magnitude  and the implied changes  of the endogenous  variables  therefore  appear unrealistically
large. On  the other  hand,  our analysis  indicates  that  the real interest  rate  is one ofthe most important
variables,  a result consistent  with the finding by Phelps and Zoega (1998) using unemployment
cross-country  regressions. Notice also that even though fiscal policy has  no effect on ithe  real
interest rate in the basic model developed  in this paper, leaving  changes  in the discount  factor of
capitalists  and/or changes  in productivity  growth  as the only sources  of interest  rate charnges,  an
OLG  version of the model  along the lines developed  by Blanchard  (1985)  and used by Hoon and
Phelps  (1992)  would  deliver  a link between  fiscal policy and the real interest rate. Moreover,  the
equation  system  (8) can also be viewed  as representing  the equilibrium  conditions  of a small open
economy  version  of the model with exogenous  world interest  rate r.
c) Sensitivity analysis
This section  discusses  how parameter  uncertainty  affects  the simulation  results.  Our approach  is to
change  one parameter value at a time and to report the effects of an increase  in Z for the new
parameter  constellation  (results for changes  in Tare  similar). First we decrease  the discount  factor
of workers, %, from its original  value of 0.90 to 0.80.  In another experiment,  we change our
estimate  of the fraction  of self-employed  workers  searching  for a formal-sector  job, v  (1 -q "), from
its original  value of 0.20 to 0.30. Finally,  we also consider  decreases  in the absolute value of the
quit-rate  elasticities  by one standard  error. Table 5 summarizes  the results and reveals that the
parameter  variations  do not change  our main  conclusions. Indeed,  the response  of the economy  is
surprisingly  robust to changes  in parameter  values.
245. Conclusion
In this paper we incorporated  microeconomic  evidence  about  Mexican  workers  moving  into self-
employment  into a macroeconomic  efficiency  model with labor  turnover  and used the calibrated
model economy to evaluate the quantitative  effects of changes in economic policy and other
macroeconomic  shocks. As we have already  mentioned  in the Introduction,  an application  of this
method  to different  countries  and unemployment  is high on the agenda  for future  research. In this
respect, an interesting  question is whether  the calibrated  model  economy  generates  a wage curve
(Blanchflower  and  Oswald  1994),  that  is, a  negative  relationship  between  wages  and unemployment.
A glance  at table 3 confirms  that at least for the case considered  here, a wage curve does indeed
arise,  that  is, regardless  of the type of macroeconomic  shock  there is always  a negative  association
between  the formal-sector  wage  and self-employment.
There are several extensions  of the model analyzed  in this paper which seem promising.
First, allowing  for a more realistic  matching  technology  (see Section  2e) establishes  an interesting
link between  search  intensity  and efficiency  wages. Second,  a comparison  of the market  outcome
with the (constrained)  efficient allocation could offer valuable theoretical insights.  Finally, a
stochastic  version of the model with aggregate  uncertainty  would permit the study of business
cycles. We plan  to study these extensions  in future  work.
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28Appendix.
Al. Worker's  decision  problem
a) Representative  firm economy
There  is a continuum  of ex-ante  identical,  infinitely-lived  workers  whose  total probability  mass  is normalized
to N (the  number  of firms). Each  worker  has preferences  over random  consumption  sequences,  {  C
that are time- and state-additive  with logarithmic  one-period  utility  function 24
U UC  ,  )  =  10r (C  (A1)
1.  .v&  . T-.  t=
where P.  stands  for the worker's pure discount  factor. Workers  are either employed  in the formal sector
(employed)  or work in the informal  sector  (self-employed).  Workers  do not participate  in capital markets
and their consumption  level is therefore  equal to their current  disposable  income. Hence,  if we denote  the
formal  sector  wage by W,, the tax rate on labor  income  from formal-sector  work  by T, and the net  pecuniary
benefit  to self-employment  by B,  ,, we have I  WI (1 -- l)  if employed in formal sector in period t
Bt  ,  t  if self-employed in period t  (A2)
Here B  is the average  benefit from self-employment  and 0, a worker-specific  (random)  component. For
given  wage rate  and benefits,  a worker  chooses  a quit/search  rule  which  maximizes  (Al) subject  to the  budget
constraint  (A2).
We  are  interested  in an equilibrium  growth  path  along  which  consumption,C,, and  wage, WF,  grow
at a constant  rate equal  to the growth  rate of technological  progress,g. Thus, we introduce  the following
growth-adjusted  variables: c  C  IA  w =  W/A,  with A, = Ao (1+g)'  being the exogenous
parameter  of labor  efficiency. We also assume  that average  self-employment  benefits,  B,, grow  at the rate
g and define: b = Bt /At.  We have dropped the time-subscript  on growth-adjusted  wage and benefit
payments  to indicate  that  these  variables  are  expected  to be constant,  an expectations  turning  out to be correct
24The  log-utility  assumption  is not essential  (CRRA-utility  would suffice),  but provides  a direct
link  to the empirical  section in which log-wages  are used in the regressions.
29in  equilibrium.  To  ensure that the  worker's optimization problem is  well-defined, we  assume
iIn  (1 +)  <  1  In this case, maximization  of(A1) subject  to (A2) is equivalent  to solving:
MaKxlm  E [  Iftlo_j  A3)
T- - t=O  |(3
w (I -r)  if  employed in  formal sector in period t
subject to:  c  - i
There are  two sources  of idiosyncratic  uncertainty:  uncertainty  about  the idiosyncratic  component
of self-employment  benefits  and uncertainty  about  the individual  employment  status. We assume that the
sequence  of shocks  , {  (O }) 7r  with Ot =  log  , is a sequence  of identically  and independently  distributed
random  variables  with distribution  function  (  .)and  density  function  (.)  .2  Further,  the probability  of
finding  a formal sector  job when searching  is a constant,  p.  The  decision  problem  (A3)  therefore displays
a recursive  structure  and the corresponding  Bellman  equation  reads
Ve(O,x)  =  max{{log(w(O-t))  +  r3fVe(OI.x)db(0')I  (
{  log b +  0 +  f  vs(O'.  x, d1(0')  }  (A4
V'(0,x)  = max { logb + 0 +  [  f  Vs(O'.x)  dD('0') }
{p(log(w(l  -T))  + pLfVe(O'.x)df(O'))  +(l  -i)(logb  +o+8f  V5'x)&d(01)}}.
where x - (wp,  r,b). Further, V  e(O,x), respectively  VS(0,x),  denotes  the (utility)  value  of pursuing
the optimal  policy when employed,  respectively  self-employed,  when  the macroeconomic  state is x.
25Although  most of the properties  of the quit-rate  function  also hold for general  Markov
processes,  the particular  expression  for  p  (see A9) would of course change.
30It follows  from (A4)  that the optimal  strategy  is to define  a cut-off  value,  Oc  = O0(x), and to quit
a formal-sectorjob  if 0  2  0  and to search  for a formal-sectorjob  if 0  0.  Moreover,  the optimal  cut-off
value is implicitly  defined  by the following  equation
oc - log(w(1-,r)/b)  - f3 EAV(0  .x)  = 0
1-  [()o((1t,)  "  (A5)
EAV(0,CX)  - 1-  V(  (D¢)log(w(1-T)/b)  - f  0'dOf)
The economy-wide  quit-rate  function  is then simply  given  by q(x)  - 1 - (D(0 (x)),  which establishes
the link between  the solution  to the worker's decision  problem  and the quit-rate  function  entering into  the
firm's decision  problem. Using a probit  model in Section  3 amounts  to assuming  a normally  distributedO
and a linear  approximation  for the function  0 (x). Finally,  the fraction  of self-employed  workers  searching
(applying)  for a formal  sector  job is 4D  (0  (x)).
ae
Since a  =  - p(0  ) a  for x  = w,p,,r,  b,  the properties aboutthe partial derivatives of the quit- ax  C  axn
rate function  stated in Eq. (2) follow from implicitly  differentiating  (A5)  and signing  the result. In order to






w  1  +  P(O)  gl(0,x)
where g, (0  ,x) is a function  independent  of the probability  density p  (0)
Suppose  now  that there is a (growth-adjusted)  fixed cost of searching,  f  =  log F.  In this case,  the
optimal  policy is to define  to cut-off  values,  0  and 0  and to quit  a formal-sector  job if 0 2  0c2 and to
start searching  if 0 < O  . Moreover,  we have 0c2 =  0c2 (x)  implicitly  defined by an equation  analogous
31to (A5)  and O.,=  OC  (X)  = Oc 2(x)  - flp.  For  the  quantitative  analysis  both  the  derivatives  ofthe quit-rate
function,  2a  - - ,and the derivatives  of the search-rate  function,  s  cl
Ox,,  ""c2~  Ox"  'axn  aq  C  ax  as
important  role. The  empirical  analysis  provides  us  with detailed  information  aboutq,  but good  d  on  s important  ~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~abot-  daaxon
are lacking. However,  since  we have  0c (x)  = 0 2(X)  - flp,  the following  expressions  relate  the search-
rate  function  to  the  (observed)  quit-rate  function:  aS  - _  ¢( 0 2  afqP)  a  and
as  (P(0 -fiP)  aq  O  ax"  (0c2)  OaX,
ap  9(0,2)  L  ap  p  .
In principle, the above relationship  in conjunction  with information  on search cost,  c, and the
distributional  characteristics  of the idiosyncratic  shocks,  0, could be used to calculate  the response  of the
search  intensity  to aggregate  shocks. However,  the expression  also makes  clear that the quantitative  answer
crucially  depends  on distributional  assumptions  determining  the  ratio  of probability  densities  evaluated  at the
cut-off value,  . In this paper, we choose not to make assumptions about the distributional
characteristics  of 0 .26  Instead,  we impose  simplifying  assumptions  rendering  all results independent  of the
probability  density  evaluated  at the respective  cut-off  value. More  specifically,  we deal with  the problem  of
unobserved  search intensity by assuming that search costs are small, that is, f  - 0.  In this case, the




The assumption  of small search cost seems to create a problem by itself since in this case the
quitting/search  model developed so far implies that s  = 1 - q, which is not the case for the data set we
consider.  However,  even  if there  are  no search  costs,  the above  relationship  need not  hold if the  idiosyncratic
shock  process  exhibits  serial correlation.  In the case  of serial  correlation,  there is still one common  cut-off
value for employed and self-employed,  but the (stationary)  distributions  are different because of self-
selection,  that is, the quit  rate is 1 - O (  0)but  the  search  intensity  is (  (0 ) and  therefore s ￿  1 - q.  Since
we only have  a very limited  knowledge  of the serial correlation  properties  of this idiosyncratic  process,  we
only deal  with the extreme  case in which  there are two types of workers. The behavior  of type I workers  is
correctly  described  by the Bellman  equation  (A4) (no serial correlation). Type  two workers,  on the other
26Especially  when 0 is interpreted  as "taste-shock",  such a procedure  seems very questionable.
32hand,  never  move  (no stochastic  shock)  and therefore  stay  either in the formal  or the informal  sector  forever
(for the time span  covered  by our data). If a fraction  v of the total labor  force is correctly  characterized  by
the Bellman equation (A4) (type I), then the search  rate is given by s(x)  = v(1 -q(x)),  which is the
expression  used in the text. 2'  Notice  that v is a number  independent  of x.
b) Many Firms
We consider now an economy in which i = 1, ... ,N  identical firms set wages in an uncoordinated fashion
(they  play  a Nash  game). Except  for  this modification,  the economy  is identical  to the one considered  in part
a). For simplicity,  we again consider  the case  of no search  cost. The Bellman  equation  of a worker  who is
currently  employed  by firm i paying  wage w. reads
rVe(O(W  x)  =  max{{log(w!(-0))  +  0  [fl`(O.w.,x)  dO(I')}j  (A7)
{  log b +  0 +  Vs(O',  x)  dq(Ot)}}
where V'(.)  is the  value function  of the Bellman  equation  (A4)  (assuming  all other  firms are  paying wage
w). The optimal  strategy  is again  to define a cut-off  value,  Oci  =  0 (w.,x),  and to quit a formal-sectorjob
if 0 2 O  and to search  for a formal-sectorjob  if 0 < O... Moreover,  the optimal  cut-off  value  is implicitly
defined  by the following  equation
H  - log(wP(1-t)/b)  - f  EA  V(w;,0.,x)  =  0
EAV(wi,0c,x)  log(w(-T))-pog(w(l-))-(-p)logb-pP  EAVI
1  -plog(wlog  )  -(PE)  AV4(Ag
1 - f(D10  d'(0
The quit-rate  function  of firm i  isthengivenby  q(w.,x)  -I  -4  (0C(wP,x)).
a  (p(O~~  a-  a  _  _
Since  - 0  =  ) -c  forx  = w,p,T,band-  =  -(P0(c  ,the  PrP
ax  n  te  roerie
27This  formula  changes  once  we allow  for the possibility  that the fraction of formal-sector-only
workers  is different  from the fraction  of informal-sector-only  workers.
33about  the partial  derivatives  of the quit-rate  function  stated  in Eq. (1) follow from implicitly  differentiating
(AS) and signing  the result. In order to calculate  the function  1i  (.),  we need an explicit  expression  of the
following  derivative:
1  aEAI2
w  ow.  *wlW-
awl  aEA V
Ci  (A9)
1 +
1  1 -f3d(O)
w  1 +2es)(c
where g2 (.)  is a function  independent  of the density  (p  (0c).
We are interested  in the ratio
aq  AOC
aw. iz"  OCW.-(A)
dwz  wi~  ow,  I-  (A10)
aq  ae
aw  aw
Expression  (Al 0) depends  on the probability  density  evaluated  at the cut-off  value,  q(p0), which is difficult
to pin down  without  a very detailed  knowledge  of the distributional  characteristics  of the random  variable
0. Evoking  again  the  principle  of "independence  of results  from irrelevant  distributional  details",  we ask  for
an approximation  yielding  an expression  for ,uwhich  is independent  of (p  (0).  One such approximation  is
to take the limit p(Oc)  - 0, that is, to evaluate ,u at small values  of  (p(O). In this case, (Al 0) becomes
Equation  (5) used in the text (observing  that O(0)  = 1  - q).
A2. Capitalist' Decision Problem
There  are i =  1,... ,N identical,  infinitely-lived  capitalist  with time-additive  preferences  over conisumption
sequences, {C1 .}g=O:
34cl-P  -I
U({C.  o)  =  P  I  l  (All)
In (All)  p  stands for the pure discount factor of capitalists and p for their coefficient  of relative risk
aversion.
Each  capitalist  owns  one firm.  Each  firm  i (owned  by capitalist  i ) combines  capital  Kit and  labor  L,
to produce output Y . Changes  in the employment  level create adjustment  cost. Hiring new workers  is
associated  with recruitment  and training  cost. In the case  of training  cost, we assume  that  training  takes  one
period  and  that the human  capital  created  through  training  is destroyed  once  the worker  quits  (match  specific
human capital),  that is, newly hired workers always have to be trained regardless  of their previous work
experience.  Following  Phelps  and Hoon  (I1992),  whose  specification  of employment  adjustment  cost derives
from  Hayashi's  treatment  of capital  adjustment  cost  (Hayashi  1982),  we assume  that the  total cost  of training
and hiring  is independent  of the capital stock and that net output produced is linear homogenous in
(K.,, A L.,  A H.,), where A, stands for the (common)  efficiency  of labor and  Ht  for the number of
U9 t  it,  I  I  t  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~It
workers hired by firm i.  More precisely,  we assume that output net of adjustment cost is equal to
F(K 1,  A, Lit)  - T(A  H.1,  A  L it),  where F(.,.)  is a standard neoclassical production function and
T(.,.)is  a linear homogenous function.  Moreover, the adjustment cost function satisfies: a?ax,y) >  o,
ax
a?x,y) <  O, a i(,y)  2  0.  Notice that we permit the case of linear adjustment  costs, ay)  = O, for ay  ~~ax 2 ax2
which adjustment  to the optimal  employment  level is instantaneous.
Each firm employs a large number  of workers.  Firm i  chooses  sequences  of consumption  (of
owner i ), capital,  investment,  employment,  and hiring  as  well  as a wage  rate 28 which  maximize  (Al1) subject
to the constraints 29
28We  only allow  the firm to choose  one wage rate, not an entire sequence  of wage rates. Deriving
the quit-rate  function  from the worker's Bellman  equation  when the firn can choose arbitrary  wage
sequences  { Wf }t O  is a nightmare.
29We  assume  that each self-employed  worker  produces  what he consumes,  namely b. If b is
interpreted  as unemployment  benefits,  then it should  be added  to the right-hand-side  of the last  last
constraint  .
35K.  ttl=(  1  -8)  Kit + 1.
=  (1 -q(w,,x))  Lit + Ht
Y,  = F(KO,A1L. 1)  (A12)
Yt  =C.  +  1  + W A  L  + T(AL  ,A  H.)
I1  It  It  i  t  it  l  it,  ItI
Kio ,  L.0 given -
Introducethefollowinggrowth-adjusted:  k.t = K  IAO,  i.  = I.A,  c.1 =  C  .IA,,y  iA
(recall  that the size of the labor  force  is normalized  to one). Introduce  further  the hiring  rateh  =  H  /IL
and let lit = Lit . Clearly, maximizing (All)  subject  to (A12) is equivalent  to solving the following
optimization  problem:
max  E  fit  tt C
subject to  :  k11 t+  =  -+g  [(1-a)k,1 + ii,]  (A13)
II  I+  =[1 + h  - 4(W.,X) J  lit
F(k.t1 l.)  =  I+  i  + WI  i + T(h.)  i
kio  0  Ii  given,
with T(h.,)  - T(h,t, 1) and the growth-adjusted  discount factor  PC=  (1 +g)'7.  To render  the
capitalist' maximization  problem  well-defined,  we require f3  < 1.  Writing down the Euler equations
associated  with the optimization  problem  (A13) leads  to Equation  (4).3°
30The  sufficiency  conditions  require  certain  assumptions  about  the second-order  derivatives  of
the quit-rate  function. We do not attempt  to derive  these properties  from the Bellman  equation  (A4) and
(A7).
36Table 1.
Summary Statistics  l
Var  Nobs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
move  100978  .02448  .1545  0  1
hire  100978  .6313  .1866  .34  1.13
mwl  100978  1.674  .05319  1.51  1.76
mw3  100978  1.856  .1060  1.54  1.94
exp  100978  21.61  13.01  0  62
exp2  100978  636.3  684.9  0  3844
sch  100978  7.302  2.808  0  11
|  sch2  100978  61.2 0  37.02  0  121
Table 2.
- _____________Probit  Regression
Unconstrained  Symmetry Imposed  Summary Statistics
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err.
move  .0245  .1545
log w  -1.3153  .3895  1.674  .05319
log b  .8879  .1965  1.857  .1060
log w-  log b  -.6436  .1522  -.183  .06625
P  .3122  .05647  .3650  .04801  .6310  .1866
school  -.08249  0.01231  -.08253  0.01231  7.302  2.808
(school) 2 .004241  0.000968  .004232  0.000978  61.204  37.02
experience  .03200  .002887  .03200  .002886  21.612  13.00
(experience) 2 -.000535  .0000556  -.000536  .0000556  636.327  683.9
constant  -1.6167  .3860  -2.3195  .06131
Nobs  100978  100978
Significance  X 2(6)=440.8 p=O.OO  X 2(5)=44 0.7  p=0.00
Test of  a.=-ab  x  _2(1)=3.41  p=.065
37Table 3.
Parameter Values for Baseline Model
Quit-rate  elasticity  aqiaw  =  - aqlab  - aqla|  -.03737
Quit-rate  elasticity aqlap  .06231
Formal-sector  employment  I*  .637
Average turnover rate q  =  h  .02448
Fraction of self-employed searching for a job  V  (1 -q_)  .20
Workers' discount factor P.r  .90
Implied  average  probability  of finding  ajob p  .2148
Implied  parameter pi  2.54
Implied parameter v  0.21
Table 4.
Policy Effects: Baseline Model  1
Tax reduction  Ar  = - .01  MPL  increase AZ = .01
Wage  change Aw  .0068 [0.68%]  .0156 [1.56%]
Probability  change Ap  -.000281 [-0.13%]  .000776 [.36%]
Turnover  rate change Aq  -.000643 [-2.63%]  -. 000535 [-  2.19%]
Employment  change Al  .00577 [0.91%]  .00589 [.93%]
Table  5.
|________________  Sensitivity Analysis: Effects of  AZ  =  .01  =
____________  f3=.8  v(1  -q *) = .3  aqlaw  =  -.0285  aqlap  = .0541
Aw  .0222  .0183  .0156  .0157
Ap  .002407  .000579  .000593  .0007389
Aq  -.000803  -.000628  -.000409  -.000544
Al  .00802  .00687  .00449  .00599
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